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[CASCADING CRISES: ORBITAL DEBRIS AND 
THE WIDENING OF SPACE SECURITY] ABSTRACT: The Kessler syndrome predicts that Earth orbit will see a runaway growth of orbital debris regardless of debris mitigation measures put in place by space users. Active debris removal is considered here as a way to ameliorate the Kessler syndrome and stave off the worst of its predictions – but the cascading problem within academia of widening ‘space security’ to include non-military risks in ‘security’ threat analyses jeopardises the deployment of active debris removal systems without the negative political repercussions of them being perceived as anti-satellite weapons. Based on a conceptual discussion of the term ‘security’ and the perspective of US space policy, an argument is made to keep ‘space security’ traditional in its focus – in that it should only be concerned with the political-military threats that space powers may pose to each other. The environmental hazards of space should not be considered security threats, although they are indeed crucial problems to address if human civilisation wishes to continue to utilise space and expand its presence into the cosmos. As orbital debris will continue to pose risks to space assets regardless of the political climate, it should be viewed in terms of a space development agenda, rather than a national security threat. 
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Cover image: a computer generated image representing objects in Earth orbit that are being 
tracked. 95% of those objects are debris objects. The orbital debris dots are scaled according to the 
image size of the graphic to optimize their visibility and are not scaled to Earth. Credit to NASA, 
image is taken from: http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/photogallery/beehives.html  
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1: Introduction 
I - Introduction  
 Space is an environment and a medium which is used to great effect by modern 
civilisation and the United States has the greatest dependence on space-based systems due 
to its space-based commerce, military, and critical infrastructure. Logically, anything 
which threatens or poses a risk to these systems can be a cause for great concern. For 
example, should US forces lose the use of satellite assets in any given theatre on Earth, 
they would lose their comparative edge of coordination and precision guided munitions 
(PGM). Should space commerce be disrupted, personal credit transactions and electronic 
bank transfers would lose the authoritative time-verification services provided by 
satellites and become impossible to complete. 
 How should the United States deal with the hazards in space? The hazards to 
space systems range from the intentional threats and weapons of other states (such as anti-
satellite (ASAT) missiles and ground-based lasers) to unintentional and indiscriminate 
environmental risks such as solar storms, orbital debris, and accidental collision. 
Proposing answers to all of the United States’ vulnerabilities and risks in space is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. However, some valuable insights can be gained by 
addressing the topic of orbital debris and how it has been assumed into the domain of 
‘space security’ within academia, and whether this trend of ‘widening’ the concept of 
security in space is beneficial for the study and perhaps the practice of US space policy.  
II – Dissertation outline 
 Policy and academic insights may be gained by asking the question “should orbital 
debris be considered a security issue for the United States?” This central question, which 
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guides the entire investigation, raises a series of sub-questions: what is the meaning of 
security in space?; does this allow for the inclusion of orbital debris into calculations of 
security policy in space?; does a wider definition of space security offer greater risks of 
negative international reaction for dealing with space debris than a narrow, or traditional, 
definition of security in space? If space debris is considered a national security issue, will 
the United States trigger a political backlash against such a dual-use system as ADR?  
 Chapter two sets the theoretical foundation for the inquiry of US space policy and 
the normative conceptual argument over the meaning of ‘space security’ for the 
subsequent chapters. After reviewing many instances of ‘security widening’ to include 
non-state referent objects (deepening security) and non-military and non-intentional risks 
to space assets (broadening security). This wanton widening of security has brought about 
the commonly used term ‘space security’. In many instances within academia, ‘space 
security’ is taken to mean the study of, or freedom from, all threats or risks to the 
operation of space systems. This includes the space weapons of another actor to debris, 
satellite malfunctions, and solar storms. ‘Space security’ is a term which is often used but 
hardly analysed. The second chapter analyses academic uses of the term and questions 
this wanton widening of the concept of US ‘security’ in space, and establishes a traditional 
definition of security in space activities as an alternative, taken to mean the political-
military challenges that other actors can intentionally pose to the United States. From this 
definition, orbital debris is not considered a security issue.  
 Chapter three examines the character of US policy regarding space and security, 
the problem of orbital debris and how ADR systems work. It looks at a range of official 
documents to attempt to determine whether non-military risks have been securitised, and 
whether there is a risk of the contamination of non-military risks in space with the 
connotations of security in policy. Chapter three is also a briefing on the core problem of 
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the dissertation – orbital debris.  Every rocket launched into orbit or activity in space 
creates some amount of debris – such as defunct or unused satellites, spent rocket stages, 
detached explosive couplings, a runaway toolkit,1 flecks of paint,2 and anything else that 
does not serve a human-derived purpose in orbit. At orbital speeds of kilometres per 
second (km/s), there is so much kinetic energy involved in impacts between space objects 
that the destruction of useful space systems from collisions is always a risk. “At [these 
speeds], a piece of debris has ten times the energy density of dynamite, and a few-gram 
object (like a penny) would likely cause a lethal event on the International Space Station.”3 
 Even if there were an end to satellite launches tomorrow, it may not make a 
difference to the growth in the number of orbital debris in low-Earth orbit (LEO), where 
spy and many remote observation satellites are positioned.4 The number of debris objects 
will continue to increase as a result of cascading collisions in orbit. This runaway growth 
in orbital debris is referred to as the Kessler syndrome. This does not bode well for the 
continued safe use of the space environment, and when one considers that launches will 
continue which will generate more debris (even with international voluntary debris 
mitigation guidelines in place5), the problem may only exacerbate further. As debris 
mitigation may not resolve or manage the debris problem, there are proposals of active 
debris removal (ADR) systems. What is analysed is how these systems pose a dual-use 
challenge as ADR systems can easily be seen as ASAT systems; a possible way to place 
                                                          1 Tarik Malik, ‘Tool bag lost in space meets fiery end’, Space.com, 03/08/2009, http://www.space.com/7088-tool-bag-lost-space-meets-fiery.html, accessed 15/07/2012.  2 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), ‘Space debris and human spacecraft’, http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html, accessed 15/07/2012.  3 Claude Phipps, Mike Lander, ‘What’s New for Laser Orbital Debris Removal?’, American Institute of 
Physics Conference Proceedings (No. 1402, 2011) p. 339 4 J.-C. Liou, N.L. Johnson, N.M. Hill, 'Controlling the growth of future LEO debris populations with active debris removal', Acta Astronautica (66, 2010) p. 648 5 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), ‘IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines’, IADC 02-01, September 2007  http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/IADC_Mitigation_Guidelines_Rev_1_Sep07.pdf, accessed 15/07/2012. 
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weapons in space for other stated ends. Tasking ADR systems under the ‘security’ rubric 
may intensify dual-use concerns among the space powers. 
 Chapter four brings the theoretical and empirical chapters’ conclusions together, 
and puts the case forward for desecuritising the many threats to ‘space security’ which 
have been collated together by numerous academics. Despite a general policy resistance to 
this from the White House, it remains a concern how treating orbital debris as security 
issues may create greater risks with ADR deployment as the dual-use nature of such 
technology may create suspicions and negative political consequences within and among 
other space powers that the USA may be deploying ASAT weapons systems under the 
guise of ADR. 
III – Securitisation  
 Columba Peoples rightly declares that the militarisation-weaponisation of space 
debate misses the wider dynamics and understandings of ‘space security’.6 Indeed, space 
is being securitised. This is proceeding within, and remains unchallenged by, academia 
which is focused on policy discussion and may yield influence on policymakers under the 
right circumstances. Debating whether the weaponisation of space serves American 
‘security interests’ or not often relates to what one thinks space security means. As we 
shall see in chapter two, those in favour of making space a sanctuary tend to adopt a 
widened referent point of security (the international system or the space environment 
itself, with non-military risks treated as security threats), and those who favour or do not 
wholly oppose weaponisation of space (placing weapons in space) tend to concentrate on 
the military threats to US space systems. Failing to discuss the meaning of security in 
space precludes the possibility of understanding the character of space warfare, and that 
one could potentially engage in ‘clean’ warfare in space, that is, without generating debris. 
                                                          6 Columba Peoples, 'The growing securitization of space', Space Policy (26, 2010) p. 206 
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Indeed, debris (and other environmental hazards) is a risk for every use and user of space 
– not only for military and commercial satellites. For the economic exploitation of space, a 
developmental view may be more appropriate as military activity is but one kind of 
human endeavour in the cosmos, as much as any medium of human activity. ‘Security’ is 
something that should not dominate calculations behind every non-military space activity.  
 Securitisation theory partly guides this project’s inquiry. Security is considered a 
speech act on behalf of a voice of authority7 – in this case both the US government and 
academia. It is within the US government’s power to deem orbital debris a security issue 
and mobilise resources to tackle the threat posed by renegade paint flecks and rocket 
boosters. The securitisation attempts within academia are critiqued, thereafter a widened 
securitised approach to space is contrasted with a traditional approach to space security in 
chapter four, using the possibility of deploying ADR systems as a case in point. This leads 
to a desecuritisation approach to the problem of debris and its removal. There is no overt 
securitisation attempt made by the US government in space, although there are subtle 
trends that suggest it may be happening. As a result, the greatest focus on analysing a 
securitising pattern falls on academic debate. 
 By securitising a topic such as orbital debris, the academics in question heighten 
the salience of an issue and imply that extraordinary means are required to deal with it. 
Indeed, such moves may trigger unilateral American policies, and break established 
‘norms’ if ADR systems are perceived as ASAT weapons. 8 However, one need not 
subscribe to Buzan et al’s entire theory of securitisation to use its principle to understand 
how non-military threats are being framed as security issues. For example, the assertion 
                                                          7 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998) p. 27 8 Ibid., p. 26 
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that a ‘security’ label precludes political debate9 is rejected here. It is indeed over the label 
of security itself this study’s theoretical inquiry is debating; and keeping Chinese space 
denial capabilities in the frame of ‘security’, for example, does not overwhelmingly block 
political debate on how to respond, or even whether to respond at all. Military-security 
policy issues are not above the realm of ‘politics’, as endless debate about strategy and 
national security in Western academic and journalist circles amply demonstrate. However, 
an issue framed as ‘national security’ may indeed reduce the number of assumptions 
underlying government policy that are open to critique. 
 It is only attempts at securitisation that are analysed, as the establishing of who are 
the actors, audiences, and to what extent the speech acts have succeeded in securitisation 
does not address the question asked. Although this project is inspired by Waever’s 
securitisation and desecuritisation,10 it does not follow the process of securitisation theory 
through to the letter by attempting to measure the success of securitisation. This 
dissertation only challenges the securitisation attempts. Foregoing audience reception and 
only looking at the speech acts from government and academia is no weakness in this 
study. The academic elites’ arguments over the United States’ space policies need to be 
analysed, as ‘security’ is a concept which is not addressed to any sufficient degree in space 
politics. It may be the case that runaway ‘space security’ widening is a symptom of 
political aspiration, rather than analytical clarity.11 There is a danger posited if US 
government space policy, as an audience within securitisation theory, is infested with the 
widening of space security. However, as already stated, this study is an inquiry as to 
whether debris should be securitised (in the wake of obvious attempts to do so within 
academia), rather than whether it has been successfully securitised or not. 
                                                          9 Ibid., pp. 4-5, 23 10 Ole Waever, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) On Security (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1995) 11 Simon Dalby, Environmental Security, (London: University of Minneapolis Press, 2002) p. 9 
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IV – Knowledge claims 
 The kind of knowledge this dissertation aims to create is normative in its character. 
But it draws its conclusions from both conceptual thought and empirical evidence. The 
research questions determine the methods used12 - the method are a mixture of discourse 
analysis within academia and government documents and critical thought along one’s 
own conceptual persuasions in the context of ‘security’ conceptualisation. The theoretical 
concepts of securitisation and security itself are drawn from academic literature; 
information of the real-world problem of debris is ascertained through scientific journals 
with a greater emphasis on empirical objectivity. Most, if not all, sources are secondary – 
for example there is no handling of raw space tracking data – data on debris is taken from 
non-governmental organisations, government documents, and academic presentations of 
raw data. 
 The end product is a challenge to certain tendencies within the literature reviewed. 
It is not limited to its theoretical inquiry – it aims to constructively engage with the 
academic literature to propose a better way, or approach, to politically handle the 
possibility of deploying ADR systems, if concerns over the Kessler syndrome are realised. 
Despite prescriptive tones, there is no extensive policy prescription, only a 
recommendation that certain risks in space are best considered in certain ways, lest 
unwanted international political repercussions occur. This study is also idiographic in that 
it presents an individual’s subjective interpretation of a highly debated topic. As 
expressed by Peoples, securitisation in space is a phenomenon that is not adequately 
studied and goes beyond the weaponisation debate. This study does not inherently oppose 
or favour weaponisation; rather, the point is that ADR deployment may bring (perceived) 
weapons deployment in space closer than ever before if space debris is treated as a 
                                                          12 Jonathan Grix, The Foundations of Research (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p. 31 
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security issue. This dissertation is a challenge to the acts of securitisation seen in academia 
(and US government policy to a much lesser extent) and how it may adversely affect a 
very serious problem that modern human civilisation has to face if it wishes to continue to 
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2: Space Security 
I – Introduction 
 This chapter establishes the conceptual foundation upon which the argument over 
keeping ‘security’ ‘traditional’ rests. After a traditional definition of space security is 
formed, the chapter moves on to survey how the term ‘space security’, or security in space 
politics, is used in academic sources. A traditional approach to security in space is then 
applied as an alternative to widened space security concepts in the rest of the dissertation. 
The aim of looking at academic writings is to ascertain their (possible) conceptualisations 
of security; whether they tend to fall into a traditionalist conceptualisation or have 
broadened and/or deepened it. The indicators of securitisation are thoughts of ‘security’ 
linked to particular problems, themes, or referent points. The chapter concludes that the 
concept of ‘space security’ is too often used but not adequately analysed, if at all. A case 
for keeping ‘security’ military in its terms when discussing outer space issues is presented 
as a conceptual lens for analysing the dangers and opportunities raised by orbital debris 
and their possible removal. The literature serves to illustrate the point that there is wanton 
widening of ‘security’ with regards to space activities within academia.   
II – Traditional security 
  “Critics normally address the what or who that threatens, or the whom to be secured;  they never ask whether a phenomenon should be treated in terms of security because they do  not look into “securityness” as such, asking what is particular to security, in contrast to non- security, modes of dealing with particular issues.”13 
 What is security? What is to be secured? These two questions’ answers form the 
basis for inquiry which dominates chapter four and addresses Waever’s concern above: 
                                                          13 Ole Waever, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’... p. 57. Italics original. 
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should orbital debris be considered a security issue? Similar to the under-analysis of the 
term ‘space security’, the concept of ‘security’ itself may be under-conceptualised, 
according to David Baldwin.14 Although one may share Buzan’s logical assertion that the 
word ‘security’ should mean more than a situation of any kind of threat to any actor or 
value, the kind of broadening and deepening seen in Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis is particularly what should be avoided in outer space.15  
 The concept of security put forward here begins as a response to Baldwin’s two 
questions: for whom is this security, and for which values?16 This dissertation uses the 
United States as a referent object of security, with its space-dependent military capabilities 
and related satellite systems as physical manifestations of this statist referent object. This 
does not preclude the view that in ideal terms a state such as the United States should 
exist to serve its citizens; the state’s security may be a means to another end, not an end in 
and of itself. Being ‘secure’ means perceiving a “low probability of damage to acquired 
values.”17 Framing a problem as a security issue usually means that it could escalate into 
an issue of survival, if it may not be one already.18 Although war or the use of force in 
space may not destroy the United States as a functioning entity, such a conflict would 
most likely occur with another state with long-range missile technology which may have 
the potential to escalate into a perceived fight for survival via the four other domains of 
warfare (land, sea, air, and cyber).  
 US ‘space security’ should be ‘securing’ American military and commercial 
satellites and the United States’ ability to access and use space for the ends of its policies, 
but from the threat of the denial of these space systems from another political entity. This is an 
                                                          14 David A. Baldwin, ‘The Concept of Security’, Review of International Studies (23:1, 1997)  pp. 8-12 15 Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework... p. 5 16 Baldwin, ‘The Concept of Security’... p. 13 17 Ibid. 18 Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework... p. 24 
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alteration of the Space Security Index’s definition of space security: “the secure and 
sustainable access to, and use of, space and freedom from space-based threats .”19 Rather 
than interpret any disruption to US satellites as a security issue, it is the intentional 
disruption, destruction, or negation of satellites by a political adversary that constitutes a 
threat to US space security. The term security conjures images of the state securing itself 
from the threats it perceives from the military capabilities of and political relations with 
the other states of Earth: 
 “…security, as with any other concept, carries with it a history and set of connotations that it  cannot escape. At the heart of the concept we still find something to do with defence and the 
 state. As a result, addressing an issue in security terms still evokes an image of threat-defence,  allocating to the state an important role in addressing it.”20  
 Barry Buzan may claim that simply stating a referent object is not enough, as the 
search for the referent object must be found alongside a search for the necessary 
conditions for its security; David Baldwin counters by saying that this conflates 
conceptual specification with empirical observation – the choice of the referent object 
depends upon the research question that is addressed.21 One can uncontroversially go 
further and claim that one’s own views and concepts about security can affect 
interpretations of the empirical world. To turn around David Baldwin’s logic, the referent 
object can also influence the question that is addressed. As seen in chapter four, the 
traditional security concept may yield different international political outcomes to ADR 
systems to a widened concept of security which refers to ‘international security’, or the 
security of all actors in space. 
                                                          19 Cesar Jaramillo (ed.) Space Security 2011 (Kitchener: Pandora Press, 2011) Available at www.spacesecurity.org, accessed 24/05/2012, p. 7 20 Waever, ‘Securitisation and Desecuritisation’... p. 47. Italics added. 21 Baldwin, ‘The Concept of Security’... p. 13 
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 The term ‘national security’ is an ambiguous concept which may have different 
meanings to different people. The subjective nature of ‘national security’ is laden with 
values, as Wolfers correctly claims.22 As this project is an analysis of whether orbital debris 
should be a security issue from an American government perspective, it does not adopt a 
transformative agenda; security may be an elitist or statist concept. “The language game of 
security is… a jus necessitatis for threatened elites, and this it must remain.”23 Whether one 
has a transformative agenda - vis-à-vis the state system or who is allowed to define 
‘security’ within them - or not, the issue of orbital debris and the potential of the Kessler 
syndrome can adversely affect the many boons of modern civilisation derived from space 
systems. Furthermore, the dissertation does not aim to clarify what will make the United 
States feel ‘secure’ – rather, it is over what dangers should come under the security rubric. 
 When dealing with policy problems or pressing issues in any given domain in 
empirical reality, how we think of, conceptualise, and operationalise security can have 
significant impacts on humans and the systems we depend upon. An example that comes 
to mind is the security-development nexus; how human development policies have 
become counterinsurgency (COIN) operations through securitisation.24 Discussing the 
meaning of ‘security’ matters, particularly if one can foresee different policies, outcomes, 
dangers, or opportunities emerging from them.  
III – Broadened and deepened space security 
 Some academics have been generous in their widening of ‘security’ when 
discussing ‘space security’. One of the most substantive and directly relevant academic 
works on space politics, security, and the space environment to date is James Moltz’s The 
                                                          22 Arnold Wolfers, ' “National Security” as an ambiguous concept', Political Science Quarterly (67:4, 1952) p. 481, 483 23 Waever, ‘Securitisation and Desecuritisation’... p. 56 24 Maria Stern and Joakim Ojendal 'Mapping the Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?', Security Dialogue (41:1, 2010) p. 23 
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Politics of Space Security.25 Moltz presents a compelling historical narrative of the Cold War 
space powers’ military restraint from overly testing and deploying weapons in space due 
to their ability to learn about the harmful environmental consequences from doing so.26 
Moltz is correct to stress the importance of the space environment, as it constrains or 
enables the very actions and purposes space actors have in using it in the first place. 
However, Moltz uses this environmental significance to understand (offensive) military 
restraint to push for an ‘environmental security’ approach as the most ‘useful’ framework 
for understanding the past, present, and future of politics in space.27  
 According to Moltz, military calculations alone do not determine space security as 
the environment plays such an important role in it, and that the referent object in space 
security should be the space environment itself.28 This is deepening security, as the 
environment in space affects all users of space and is characterised by transboundary 
problems which is beyond the control (and perhaps remedies) of a single actor. There is no 
surprise that Moltz also broadens the term ‘space security’ beyond traditional military 
conceptions of ‘security’: 
 “Space security depends on overcoming both man-made and natural threats… Space  security [is] the ability to place and operate assets outside the Earth’s atmosphere without 
 external interference, damage, or destruction.”29 
 Under Moltz’s vision, anything that can disrupt or destroy satellites is a security 
concern in space to all space actors. Aside from a passing mention to the transboundary 
nature of environmental space issues, Moltz does not engage in a conceptual discussion 
with environmental security. However, one can establish some common thoughts between 
                                                          25 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National 
Interests (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008, 1st edition) 26 Ibid., p. 46 27 Ibid., p. 7 28 Ibid., pp. 40, 44 29 Ibid., p. 11. Italics original. 
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Moltz and environmental security concepts. Simon Dalby uses Richard Ullman’s wider 
conception of security to encompass threats that endanger the quality of life for citizens of 
a state over a relatively short period of time, and the amount of policy options available 
for any relevant actor. In environmental security, the referent objects of security are “the 
planetary attributes necessary to sustain civilisation.”30 This resonates with the resources 
of outer space, as space systems provide the everyday life of citizens of developed and 
developing countries essential services such as navigation, telecommunications, 
emergency responder guidance, and countless luxurious or non-essential profitable 
services. Indeed, man-made problems such as debris, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and 
excited radiation in the Van Allen belts threaten modern civilisation’s benefits and 
opportunities derived from space, as well as natural hazards such as solar storms and 
near-Earth objects (NEO). These can endanger key military capabilities in Western 
militaries. Given the disadvantage militaries and economies will be at should space 
systems be degraded or disabled, it is easy to make an issue such as debris a ‘security’ 
issue given that space is a part of critical infrastructure. 
 In another text, Moltz makes an analogy of increasing space traffic and usage with 
the explosion in rail travel in the 19th Century, and the standards of time, safety, and 
conduct which it brought with it to imply that space is now at a similar point – space is 
increasing in the amount of traffic it sees and the number of actors in it. Space needs a 
regularised framework for operation. Concordantly, the many powers and actors which 
use space need a ‘broader’ and ‘common’ definition of ‘space security’ to operate safely in 
space.31 
                                                          30 Dalby, Environmental Security... pp. 5-7. Dalby refers to: Richard Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’, 
International Security (8:1, 1983) 31 James Clay Moltz, ‘Next steps towards space security’, in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz, Emma S. Hinds (eds.) Collective Security in Space: European Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2007) pp. 124-126 
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 James Moltz is not the only academic to widen ‘space security’. Two multi-author 
volumes by the Washington, D.C.-based think tank Space Policy Institute adopted the 
Space Security Index’s definition of ‘space security’: the secure and sustainable access to, 
and use of, space from space-based threats.32 Not all authors in these two volumes 
necessarily follow that line as will be shown below. Nancy Gallagher wrote of a ‘space 
security system’ which is constituted of legal conventions, customs, and norms, which 
should further the goal of ‘global security’ in space and as a result better serve American 
security interests in space.33 Gallagher does not discuss her own conceptions of security in 
any great detail. One can reasonably deduce that her vision of a rules-based regime for 
regulating outer space activities and preventing unilateral offensive military policies from 
the United States should serve the United States’ own ‘security’ interests - by securing its 
space assets from a negative response from the other space powers on Earth. According to 
Gallagher’s logic, the use of space without rules to prevent offensive military deployments 
would create a less secure space environment, not only for the United States but for all. 
Importantly, she argues that an issue like space debris should be considered a security 
issue because achieving cooperation on space endeavours outside the ‘security realm’ 
would remain isolated and perhaps ignored.34  
 For Gallagher, a securitised cooperative approach to tackling space debris may 
spill over into more cooperative ventures in ‘space security’. However, Kiran Nair argues 
the opposite; making headway in non-military aspects of space security may spill over 
                                                          32 John M. Logsdon, Gordon M. Adams, ‘Foreword’, in John M. Logsdon, Audrey M. Schaffer (eds.) 
Perspectives on Space Security (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2005) p. iii, and: John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz, ‘Introduction’, in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) Collective 
Security in Space: Asian Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2008) p. 1 33 Nancy Gallagher, ‘Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules for Space Security’, in John M. Logsdon, Audrey M. Schaffer (eds.) Perspectives on Space Security... pp. 1-3, 27, 38  34 Ibid., pp. 33 
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into cooperation into more sensitive military space issues.35 Yet Kiran Nair also broadens 
her conception of security by speaking of non-military aspects of space security. If we were to 
use the traditional approach to security, there would be no aspect of space security that is 
not military. But there would be dangers to space assets that would not be considered 
security threats. In a similar vein, Peter Hays claims that tackling the issue of space debris 
may provide the US with the best transparency and confidence building measure (TCBM) 
opportunity, to ultimately achieve his loosely widened idea of ‘sustainable space 
security.’36 
 Xavier Pasco widens his notion of ‘space security’ by referring to the European 
Union’s (EU) ‘balanced’ and ‘holistic’ approach to space security. Pasco believes many 
policy problems that face the EU cannot be dealt with only through military approaches, 
and must be dealt with a ‘security’ orientated policy instead.37 ‘Military’ and ‘security’ are 
two terms that have very separate meanings for Pasco – tackling a problem like space 
debris may increase collective security for all in space, as opposed to some military 
policies which may jeopardise collective security in space. Indeed, he implies that the 
“international community” has security interests.38 Bertrand de Montluc echoes this by 
claiming that European countries have gradually developed an approach to security in 
space which includes more than a preoccupation with military capabilities.39 
Unfortunately, the themes or policy areas of Pasco’s or Montluc’s ‘military’ and ‘security’ 
are not spelled out, perhaps Pasco’s conception of ‘military’ is addressing offensive 
                                                          35 Kiran K. Nair, 'Space Security: Reassessing the Situation and Exploring Options', in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives... p. 85  36 Peter L. Hays, Space and Security: A Reference Handbook (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2011) p. 90 37 Xavier Pasco, ‘Enhancing Space Security in the Post Cold War Era: What Contribution from Europe?’, in John M. Logsdon, Audrey M. Schaffer (eds.) Perspectives on Space Security... pp. 57-60 38 Ibid., p. 61 39 Bertrand de Montluc, ‘Space Security: A non-US point of view’, in John M. Logsdon, Audrey M. Schaffer (eds.) Perspectives on Space Security... p. 80-81 
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capabilities by adversaries, and the ‘security’ is a general adoption of the Space Security 
Index’s broad meaning of ‘space security’.  
 Rajeev Lochan slightly adjusts the Space Security Index definition of ‘space security’ 
to mean “secure, sustainable, and denial-free access to and use of space for peaceful 
purposes and for one and all.”40 In other words, every actor has the right to use space, and 
no-one has the right to deny its use to anyone. Lochan refers to all space-faring actors as 
the referent points of this ‘space security,’ and the threats include man-made and natural 
threats to space systems, which are viewed as critical infrastructure components.41 
Dipankar Banerjee also adopts this view, claiming that India views unfettered access to 
space and the operation of space systems as critical infrastructure and key to India’s ‘space 
security.’42 
 Zhong Jing wishes for a new security concept to be developed for outer space, as 
the zero-sum security concept he accuses the US of employing is jeopardising everyone 
else’s security in space. Zhong Jing claims that conceiving of an enemy as the main threat 
in space will result in no progress and greater risks in orbit, whereas (deductively), Jing 
believes that the main threats to the space security of all actors comes not from enemies 
but perhaps the environment and the pollution human activity is depositing there.43  
 Boutwell, Hitchens, and Moltz collectively argue that instigating and maintaining 
cooperation across space sectors (such as military, commercial, and scientific) and actors is 
a good way of achieving ‘space security’. Because so many space activities across sectors 
and actors are interrelated and interdependent, Boutwell, Hitchens, and Moltz all call for 
                                                          40 Rajeev Lochan, 'Some Reflections on Collective Security in Space', in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives... p. 34 41 Ibid, p. 36 42 Dipankar Banerjee, 'Indian Perspectives on Regional Space Security', in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives... p. 125 43 Zhong Jing, 'China and Space Security', in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) Collective Security 
in Space: Asian Perspectives... pp. 77-83 
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an ‘integrated’ concept of space security to facilitate greater cooperation among space 
actors.44 Again, like so much of the literature mentioned in this chapter, there is little to no 
reflection as to what the three authors’ conceptions of security actually entail – both in 
what they may think the concept of ‘space security’ means today and what they think it 
should mean in future.  
 Exhibiting a similar tendency, D. Narayana Moorthi attempts to use human 
security to broaden and deepen a concept of space security: 
 “[Using the concept of human security] enables a broadening of our notion of space security  from its traditional conception in military terms, to encompass other threats (including those  emanating from poverty, lack of education, health hazards, environmental degradation and  natural disasters). It also emphasizes that we deepen the concept of security from the state  down to the individual level and up to the regional and international level.”45 
Using human security, according to Moorthi, allows us to see the non-military threats to 
‘peace and security,’ which may be alleviated with space systems which provide 
development tools which may improve human security capabilities. It is no revelation that 
space systems are key tools in human development. However, whether ‘development’ 
through space should be securitised is a question that is not addressed by Moorthi. 
IV - Keeping space security ‘traditional’ 
 Space development is a theme touched upon by James Moltz in his book The 
Politics of Space Security; space should be developed rather than ‘defended’ or ‘secured’.46 
This appears to be a move away from securitising outer space activities. Moltz’s opinion 
here is in stark contradiction to the main drive seen earlier in the same book as elaborated 
                                                          44 Jeffrey Boutwell, Theresa Hitchens, James Clay Moltz, 'Enhancing space security by improving stakeholder cooperation', Astropolitics (2, 2004) p. 106 45 D. Narayana Moorthi, 'What 'Space Security' means to an emerging space power', Astropolitics (2, 2004) p. 263 46 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security... p. 321 
Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security 
Page 25 of 69 
 
above. How can one call for an environmental security concept as a useful foundation for 
understanding the politics of space whilst at the same time encouraging space activities to 
be viewed as standard development practices? Rather than securitising many or all 
aspects of space activity, perhaps space should indeed be desecuritised, or at least ‘space 
security’ should instead only refer to the intentional political-military (i.e. strategic) 
challenges posed to one’s own space systems by other space powers and vice versa. 
 Daniel Deudney warned that appending ‘security’ onto environmental issues may 
serve as an attention-grabbing device with unfortunate consequences. Thinking in 
‘national security’ terms over environmental issues risks forcing an organisation equipped 
to deal with threats from violence to engage with a different kind of threat posed by 
environmental hazards where zero-sum or self-serving statist thinking may not be the best 
way to address such problems.47 Two points raised by Deudney strike a chord when 
critically assessing Moltz’s use of environmental security: first, it is analytically misleading 
to think of environmental degradation as a national security threat because the traditional 
focus of such thinking has little in common with global environmental problems and their 
solutions; and second, mobilising an awareness of environmental problems through the 
emotive power of nationalism may be “counterproductive by undermining globalist 
political sensibility.”48 Indeed, Moltz attempts to pry his version of the concept of security 
away from a single state as a referent point, and loosely refers to orbital space itself and all 
states and actors in the space environment as referent objects of security. However, if 
Waever’s claims that security has certain connotations that it cannot escape, Moltz’s 
attempt at securitising the space environment and the threats it contains may indeed 
backfire along Deudney’s logic and warnings. This would be risky if future US national 
                                                          47 Daniel Deudney, 'The case against linking environmental degradation and national security', 
Millennium (19:3, 1990) pp. 461-469 48 Ibid., p. 461 
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security space policy was to adopt Moltz’s views and incorporate space debris as a 
national security threat, and potentially take its own unilateral action in spite of 
international fears, suspicions, and doubts. This becomes increasingly worrisome if ADR 
systems are introduced to the problem of space debris, as unpopular unilateral action with 
ADR systems may not reassure other space powers which may see it as a cover for ASAT 
weapons deployment due to the dual-use nature of ADR systems. This is examined in 
greater detail in chapter four. 
 Joan Johnson-Freese asks whether protecting satellites with technology is a viable 
means to an end.49 Her policy prescription encourages the US to rely on diplomatic, 
political, and legal manoeuvres to outlaw attacks on satellites and the technologies that 
enable them.50 This better serves the United States’ space security, and the conception of 
security at that point of her argument falls easily within a traditional framing. Again, a 
discussion of ‘security’ itself is largely absent within the book. This is unfortunate as 
towards the end of it Johnson-Freese begins to simultaneously deepen space security and 
exhibit a desire to desecuritise space by preferring the term ‘space sustainability’ to ‘space 
security’ in the context of the globalised and largely peacefully-intended uses of space 
today.51 This resonates with Moltz’s claims to simultaneously tout the merits of using 
environmental security and claim the greater adequacy of viewing space through a 
(sustainable) development lens. 
 As an illustrative example, some academics tend to retain their definitions of 
‘space security’, or ‘security’ in space, to the military realm as a point of contrast to the 
literature above. Scott Beidleman discusses the Galileo versus Global Positioning System 
(GPS) debate in terms of Galileo’s potential threat to US national security, and that Galileo 
                                                          49 Joan Johnson-Freese, Heavenly Ambitions: America’s Quest to Dominate Space (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p. 2 50 Ibid., p. 63 51 Ibid., pp. 133-135 
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is a manifestation of the EU’s desire to acquire ‘security apparatus’ independently of 
NATO.52 Peter Hays mostly adheres to a traditional security approach despite a passing 
reference to ‘sustainable space security’, as his book mostly focuses on political-military 
threats to US space activity.53 These are but two examples of a wider academic literature 
which focuses on traditional security in space, or space-focused strategic studies/defence 
policy texts. This dissertation’s approach is loosely aligned to these, however it does differ 
in that it elaborates its concept of security and attempts to criticise the uncritical, 
cascading, widening of the term ‘space security’. 
 Gerard Brachet and Setsuko Aoki appear to be able to talk about some non-
military/political dangers or risks in space without having to refer to the term ‘security’. 
Gerard Brachet laments the deadlock in international discussion on arms control in space; 
and has worthy concerns over the necessity of reliable access to space and a cleaner and 
safer operating environment to space. Space access and a safe operating environment are 
not only defence issues; they are directly relevant to all uses of space. As civilian and 
military users all share the same orbital paths, it may be beneficial for them to jointly 
develop “rules of the road,” a Code of Conduct (CoC), for the benefit of all kinds of space 
actors of all state origins.54  
 Setsuko Aoki takes this logic further by explicitly referring to ‘space safety’ as a 
distinct concept separate from ‘space security.’ ““Space safety” is a concept similar to 
space security, but the focus is placed on the measures to accomplish safer conduct in 
                                                          52 Scott W. Beidleman, ‘GPS vs Galileo: Balancing for position in space’, Astropolitics (3, 2005) p. 119-120 53 Hays, Space and Security... pp. 79-81 54 Gerard Brachet, ‘Collective Security in Space: A key Factor for sustainable long-term use of space’, in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz, Emma S. Hinds (eds.) Collective Security in Space: European 
Perspectives... pp. 8-11 
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space activities by various methods.”55 A large number of different actors now use space, 
and the need for a safer and more regulated operating environment in orbit is greater 
today than before. Aoki elaborates on a space traffic management (STM) system as an 
example of space safety measures, defined as “the set of technical and regulatory 
provisions for promoting safe access into outer space, operations in outer space and return 
from outer space to Earth free from physical or radio- frequency interference.”56 It should 
be added that in ‘space safety’, physical and radio-frequency interference with satellite 
systems should be taken to mean the unintentional or accidental kind – intentional 
interference may be a hostile act of space warfare or sabotage which is a traditional 
security concern. For Aoki, realising space safety is a ‘realistic’ (or more plausible in the 
short-term) goal as safeguarding against accidental disruptions to space systems is an 
agreeable is a common goal of all space users. Passing measures for this end may not 
require arms control treaties or proposals, thus circumventing deadlock at the Conference 
on Disarmament (CD) and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS).57  
 The tension between widening security on one hand, and pushing for a 
developmentalisation of space activities on the other, is possibly a result of the 
complacency among the academics cited here with their conceptions of security. Without 
reflecting on the use of the term ‘security’, one can unintentionally follow Waever’s logic 
of securitising topics and end up wishing to desecuritise them58 after intuitively realising 
the dangers of self-interested national security thinking in a domain where every actor’s 
actions easily adversely affects the other. Perhaps this desire to refer to global space 
activities (every kind of activity in space from every kind of actor) through developmental 
                                                          55 Setsuko Aoki, 'Japanese Perspectives on Space Security', in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) 
Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives... p. 52 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Waever, ‘Securitisation and Desecuritisation’... pp. 57-58 
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terms is a result of the lack of a concept of international security.59 As already referred to, 
Moltz and Johnson-Freese appear to step back from a widened ‘security’ concept in space 
due to their inability to escape the connotations of the state, defence, force, and self-
interest that may accompany the term ‘security’. 
 One cannot disagree with desires to see a safe operating environment in space for 
all users which partake in the world system if one has no radical transformative agenda 
for the global political economy as we know it. Therein lays the crucial point of difference: 
safety. environmental degradation poses a risk to the safe operation of assets in space. 
Putting unintentional environmental hazards into the same mental framing as intentional 
targeting of satellites for strategic reasons conflates the differing issues at hand and risks 
the conflation of space development and security interests in orbit.  
 Securitising space development may put too much political self-interest on the part 
of the space powers for something that should be done in normal conditions. ‘Normal’ is 
taken here to mean conditions of peace, or the absence of openly hostile behaviour 
between two or more space powers. Conversely, a condition of war or an act of aggression 
is taken to mean an ‘abnormal’ or ‘exceptional’ state of affairs. This helps fill a gap in 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis by defining a possible condition of normality. Like 
air and maritime traffic, global regulations exist for the efficient and safe passage of 
civilian and military vessels. Atmospheric turbulence or turbulent seas may not be 
considered security threats; why should environmental disturbances in space be any 
different? Securitising space debris may attempt to make the normal, or needed behaviour 
to manage human space systems, ‘exceptional’. Securitising space debris may make 
unilateral national-security action more palatable for policymakers.  
 
                                                          59 Ibid., p. 48 
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V - Space Security 
 This is a hypothesis that will be tested in chapter four: using a widened concept of 
security in space endangers the potential of ADR systems to mitigate or even resolve the 
burden of orbital debris. This is opposed to keeping environmental hazards free of 
security language, and in the absence of national security-framed thinking there may be 
more potential for reassuring moves to use ADR systems without raising international 
fears of an ASAT weapons deployment. As a conclusion of the literature survey and the 
critique of widened notions of space security above, the pursuit of space security should 
be taken to mean an actor’s attempts to protect its access to and use of  space and the 
relevant satellite systems from intentional threats (physical and/or electronic) by other 
actors in space. Before testing the hypothesis, current US space policy with regards to 
security and debris must be examined alongside a briefing on the problem of debris itself 
and proposed ADR systems. After all, this dissertation attempts to make itself relevant to 
empirical reality. The next chapter illustrates US policy and the debris problem and 
possible solutions before combining the theoretical inquiry constructed in this chapter 
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3: Policy and Debris 
I - Introduction 
 This chapter examines US policy with regards to the use of ‘security’ in space, the 
problem of orbital debris, and illustrates some active debris removal (ADR) system 
proposals. To what extent have non-military hazards or risks in space been securitised? 
This chapter presents an interpretation of the language seen in the policy documents used. 
Doing this serves two purposes: the first is that it is important to know what the US is 
thinking about space as it is our referent object of security, second, some non-military 
dangers to US National Security have been or are dangerously close to being ‘securitised’ 
in print. This warns of the potential that the environmental hazards of space could be 
securitised in US policy, and academic widening of security may exacerbate this risk.  
 Official documents are chosen as virtually the only indicator of government 
thinking in this study for four reasons: (a) the documents used are publically available and 
offer an easily accessible common point of reference for researchers on government policy; 
(b) a comprehensive analysis of oral statements by a myriad of government officials is 
beyond the scope of this study; (c) such documents are the outcome of policymaking 
among the bureaucracies and interested parties, and are able to show in one way to what 
extent non-military risks have been securitised in a carefully-worded document; and (d) 
open policy documents in the security field are (ideally clear) communications to external 
actors which can influence the perception of US actions in foreign capitals.  
 The Kessler syndrome is a scientific model, and only the conclusions of scientific 
studies are used; the finer workings of the Kessler syndromes and predictive debris 
modelling are not explored to any great degree. Rather, the Kessler syndrome is posed as 
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a looming problem, and the ADR proposals are idealised as a way to tackle a runaway 
growth in orbit. 
II - US policy and space security 
 For the most part, US policy documents at the meeting point of space and security 
refer to US national security. Despite the 2010 National Space Policy’s (NSP) introduction 
nodding towards the notion of a multi-actor political space environment and stating an 
intent to work for the benefit of all in space, the American insistence that the “peaceful 
purposes” of space includes “national and homeland security activities” remains largely 
unchanged.60 The 2010 NSP does not single out any particular threat to the US, both from 
and in space. The NSP is document which covers a broad range of factors of US space 
policy, such as the space industrial base, space science, and national security missions. It 
considers the interdependence of all users of space with each other, and presents a desire 
to minimise risks in orbit (such as debris mitigation practices and space situational 
awareness (SSA) improvement).61  
 Towards the end of the document the national security uses of space systems are 
highlighted. The US plans to “maintain the capabilities to execute the space support, force 
enhancement, space control, and force application missions.”62 These are traditional US 
military requirements of space. The NSP largely adheres to a statist referent point as it 
uses the term national security. It wishes to utilise national security space assets, in 
accordance with foreign powers ‘if necessary’, to “detect, warn, characterize, and attribute 
natural and man-made disturbances to space systems of U.S. interest.”63 As a ‘disturbance’, 
                                                          60 US Government, ‘National Space Policy of the United States of America’, 28/06/2010, Washginton, D.C., available online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf (accessed 02/07/2012) pp. 1-3 61 Ibid., p. 4 62 Ibid., p. 14 63 Ibid. Italics added. 
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the emotive power of the word ‘threat’ is avoided; disturbances such as solar storms and 
debris are not explicitly referred to as security threats to ‘space systems of US interest.’ 
This notion of ‘disturbance’ is in stark contrast to the definition of ‘space security’ as 
proposed by the Space Security Index which defines “space security” as “the secure and 
sustainable access to, and use of, space and freedom from space-based threats.”64 Here, 
solar storms and debris can easily take on the emotive exceptional notion of ‘threat’, as 
opposed to everyday routine potential of disturbances. In the previous chapter, we have 
seen the Space Security Index’s definition of space security gain significant mileage within 
academia; in contrast the 2010 NSP does not appear to explicitly link non-military space 
issues as security issues. 
 In more general terms, there is a perceived shift in space policy between the Bush 
Jnr and Obama administrations. The Obama administration appears to believe (at least to 
a greater extent than the previous administration) that the USA cannot “do everything on 
its own.”65 There may be a shift from unilateral language to more inclusive terms, but they 
may only be shifts of rhetoric.66 The 2010 NSP “is an outward looking policy aimed at 
international cooperation and responsible behavior in space.”67 This is not surprising as 
the NSP has to account for more than the military aspects of space activity. But what is of 
note is that a more multilateral approach (in declared policy) is 
 “…in rather stark contrast to the unilateralist path to leadership articulated in the 2006 Bush  administration space policy. It also recognizes that in the space arena other nations and groups  of nations have developed, and are continuing to develop, world-class space capabilities, and 
                                                          64 Cesar Jaramillo (ed.) Space Security 2011... p. 7 65 Marcia S. Smith, ‘President Obama’s National Space Policy: A change in tone and a focus on space sustainability’, Space Policy (27:2011) p. 20 66 Ibid., p. 21 67 Ibid., p. 23 
Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security 
Page 34 of 69 
 
 that unless they are engaged with the USA as they pursue their own objectives, other poles of  space leadership will emerge.”68 
This will remain relevant for ADR systems and how they may be presented to the space 
actors of Earth should the United States begin develop them. A diplomatically open 
channel may yield better responses than a unilateral American approach, and such an 
approach may be partly determined in how orbital debris is framed – as a security issue or 
a space development problem. Also, ADR technologies cannot be assumed to be under an 
American technological monopoly, especially as we consider long-term future of space 
activity. Indeed, a future US administration may have to deal with the problem of a 
foreign ADR deployment. 
 Space is mentioned in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) within the context 
of Washington’s attitude to the global commons. Space, alongside other global commons 
such as international airspace, seas, and cyberspace, will be safeguarded “from those who 
would deny access or use them for hostile purposes.”69 This resonates with the NSP’s 
declaration to maintain capabilities to enable space control and force application. Space is 
seen by the NSS as the avenue of ‘asymmetric’ attack, alongside the cyber realm, and 
believes that space and cyber systems are vulnerable to attack. With these statements, it 
may be that what the United States sees as the most pressing danger to its space systems is 
that of intentional attack from another actor, as opposed to unintentional dangers such as 
environmental degradation or turbulent solar storms. 
 Looking at the NSS beyond its perception of space puts the NSP in a wider context. 
The United States’ national security priorities are nuclear proliferation and (jihadi) 
terrorism. Space provides crucial support roles in addressing these security issues. 
                                                          68 John M. Logsdon, ‘Change and continuity in US space policy’, Space Policy (27, 2011) p. 2 69 US Government, ‘National Security Strategy’, May 2010, Washington, D.C. Available online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 02/07/2012), p. 50 
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However, the NSS also refers to its economic well-being, ‘food security’, ‘global health’, 
‘sustainable development’, and climate change as non-traditional problems that are a 
priority for the United States to deal with, among other issues.70 This is a linking of 
security to ‘broader’ non-military issues. Also, there is a hint of a deepening of security to 
the global level as “the United States of America will continue to underwrite global 
security.”71 Perhaps the United States equates its security with global security, or that the 
US homeland means the globe.72 ‘Food security’ is defined in the NSS as an initiative to 
“combat” hunger and help governments provide food for their people.73 “Cybersecurity” 
is singled out in the NSS; it is applied to action taken against any actor which has 
nefarious intent towards US interests in or via the cyber realm.74 This shows that the US 
may consider criminal and state-sponsored hackers as security threats. These examples 
show that the broadening and deepening of ‘security’, whilst in no way absolute, is 
present to varying degrees within US policymaking and public communication. This is a 
cause for concern with the potential to make orbital debris a security issue. 
 The NSS can be seen as a manifesto of the United States’ perception of the most 
pressing dangers facing it. A traditional security mandate would instinctively not be 
concerned with including space debris in a security policy debate – but the NSS has 
included a wide range of non-military problems into a debate laden with national security 
motivations, as it is designed to. It is difficult to assert in any objective manner to what 
extent the NSS accurately portrays what the US government truly considers to be the most 
important of issues. But it shows through one window what is on the mind of 
policymakers. These documents can be taken as one of the outcomes of the various 
                                                          70 Ibid., pp. 4-5, 33, 39,47 71 Ibid., p. 1 72 David Grondin, ‘The (power) politics of space: The US astropolitical discourse of global dominance in the War on Terror’, in Natalie Bormann and Michael Sheehan (eds.) Securing Outer Space (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 113 73 US Government, ‘National Security Strategy’, p. 39 74 Ibid., pp. 27-28 
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pushing and pulling of bureaucratic politics and the aggregation of public and private 
interests.75 
 The US Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2011 National Security Space Strategy’s 
(NSSS) main message is that the US is operating in a “congested, contested, and competitive” 
strategic environment in space.76 Space is increasingly populated by a greater number and 
diversity of actors, with greater numbers of actors potentially possessing space denial 
capabilities, and greater international competition over the space market. Space debris is 
given the opening shot of the NSSS’ chapter on the ‘strategic environment’ of space, citing 
China’s 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test and claims that there are approximately 
22,000 trackable man-made objects in orbit. 1,100 of those objects are satellites; the rest are 
debris. Untrackable debris objects number in the hundreds of thousands. A graph 
showing the growth of the debris population in orbit since the dawn of the space age is 
shown to dramatic effect (reproduced as figure 1 below). The NSSS also cites the 
competition over radio frequency slots as a congestion issue.77 Other than a desire to be 
prepared to operate in a degraded environment in space in the event of open hostilities, 
the 2011 NSSS is unremarkable as it is aligned with the broader 2010 NSS and NSP. If 
nothing else, it shows that non-military elements of the space environment may be in an 
elevated position in the minds of policy makers. Also, the NSSS hints at the possibility of 
adopting a CoC for promoting safe practices in space: 
                                                          75 Eligar Sadeh and Brenda Vallance, ‘The Policy Process’, in Damon Coletta, Frances T. Pilch (eds.) 
Space and Defense Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010) pp. 125-127  76 US DoD, ‘National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary’, January 2011, Washington, D.C., available online: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/ (accessed 24/05/2012) p. 1. Italics original. 77 Ibid., pp.1-2 
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 “We believe setting pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space can help avoid collisions and  other debris-producing events, reduce radiofrequency interference, and promote security and  stability in the space domain – all of which are in the interests of all nations.”78 
  This does not necessarily link radiofrequency allocations to a concept of ‘security’ – 
it appears that ‘security and stability’ are additional topics of consideration for a CoC. As 
far as the NSSS is concerned, a condition of ‘security’ need not necessarily follow from 
mitigating debris and resolving frequency slot allocation issues. Based on this reading of 
the Obama Administration’s views, as an authority in defining what national security 
issues are through a speech act, we can reasonably ascertain that there is no overt case of 
linking traditional notions security with non-military problems such as orbital debris or 
solar storms. However, non-military problems are raised frequently alongside the need for 
‘national security space systems’ to carry out their tasks. In relative terms to academic 
discourse on ‘space security’, the US government has not overtly securitised non-military 
problems in outer space. This is still a cause for concern if there are risks in securitising 
ADR systems and the problem of debris. 
III – Space junk off the starboard bow! 
 The trigger for this study now needs to be briefed in greater detail than what was 
said in the introductory chapter. Crucially, ADR proposals need to be presented as it is the 
possible perception these systems in the future which the results of the conceptual debate 
manifest themselves in social reality. ADR systems do not exist as of yet, but they may 
well do in the years ahead. It is particularly important to remember when we consider the 
dual-use potential of ADR systems that ASAT weapons can still be political and have 
international effects even when they are only on the drawing board.79 
                                                          78 Ibid., p. 6 79 Joan Johnson-Freese, Heavenly Ambitions... p. 67 
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 ‘Space debris’ is an umbrella term taken to mean any man-made object that is up in 
orbit which does not serve a useful purpose. Defunct satellites, spent rocket bodies, 
fragments of hardware, and general junk as a result of launch activities all come under the 
term ‘debris’. However, a precise and agreed upon definition of debris objects does not 
exist.80 Space debris such as these orbit the Earth at tremendous speeds (from just above 3 
km/s to approximately 7.8km/s.81 At these velocities, the kinetic energy from objects as 
small as flecks of paint can cause damage to spacecraft upon impact, and larger ones can 
destroy upon impact. Furthermore, impact events create more debris, increasing the 
number of debris in orbit and, consequently, the chances of more debris events. If this 
were to occur enough times, it is feared that a runaway growth in debris and the 
mitigation of the utility of space for modern civilisation. This is the Kessler syndrome. This 
is further compounded by the fact that orbital debris takes a very long time to fall back to 
Earth – objects at 380km altitude take decades to deorbit and come down to Earth; at the 
geosynchronous orbit (GEO) altitude of approximately 35,800km (where most 
communications satellites are located), deorbiting takes literally millions of years.82 As a 
result, the debris population has continued to grow since the dawn of the space age (see 
figure 1).83 
                                                          
80 Michael Listner, ‘Legal issues surrounding space debris remediation’, The Space Review, 06/08/2012, 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2130/1 (accessed 17/08/2012) 81 Jeff Root, ‘Orbital speed’, Freemars.org, 18/09/2004, http://www.freemars.org/jeff/speed/index.htm, (accessed 15/07/2012)  82 Ibid. 83 Graph taken from: US DoD, ‘National Security Space Strategy...’, p. 1 
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 Significant exacerbation of the space environment has already occurred the recent 
past. In 2007 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tested an anti-satellite missile on one of 
China’s satellites. The event increased the amount of debris in orbit below 2,000km by one 
fifth.84 The Russian satellite Cosmos 2251’s accidental collision with an American Iridium 
satellite in 2009 has created over 1,200 pieces of tracked debris.85 The number of detected 
and tracked debris objects from these two debris events is over 5,500, and they make up 
36% of all objects residing in or passing through LEO.86 Only 10% of the debris generated 
has deorbited. These numbers only include the debris that can be tracked by space 
surveillance networks (SSN), which are usually greater than 10cm in diameter. Smaller 
pieces are thought to have proliferated even more, but are exceedingly difficult to track 
with contemporary space radar capabilities. The United States possesses the most capable 
                                                          84 Cesar Jaramillo (ed.) Space Security 2011...  p. 30 85 Ibid., p. 31 86 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Orbital Debris Quarterly News (16:3, 2012) http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv16i3.pdf, p. 2 
Fig. 1: (US) Satellite catalogue growth 
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SSN and the most comprehensive single debris catalogue on Earth; there is no 
comprehensive and publically available catalogue. 
 As troubling as this growth in debris over the past decade is, the Kessler syndrome 
predicts that Earth orbit will become more heavily populated by debris even should all 
launches into space end immediately. This is not to degrade the significance of the 
adoption of the IADC debris mitigation guidelines,87 but mitigation alone does not resolve 
the problem envisaged by the predictions of the Kessler syndrome: 
 “Recent numerical simulations on the evolution of orbital debris population in low-Earth orbit  (LEO, 200–2000 km altitude) indicate that the population has reached a point where the  environment is unstable and population growth is inevitable. The main conclusion from the  two studies is that even if no further space launches were conducted, the Earth satellite  population would remain relatively constant for only the next 50 years or so. Beyond that, the  debris population would begin to increase noticeably due to the production of collisional  debris.”88  
 
                                                          87 IADC, ‘IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines’... 88 J. C. Liou, Nicholas L. Johnson,  'A sensitivity study of the effectiveness of active debris removal in LEO', Acta Astronautica (64, 2009) p. 236 
Fig. 2: Forecast of the number of debris objects in LEO which are larger than 10cm in diameter up to the early 23rd century 
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 If the sobering forecasts of figures 2 and 389 are correct, and should the Kessler 
syndrome be realised, the space powers of the 2060s will begin to see a runaway growth in 
the number of collisions and debris in LEO. Liou and Johnson studied the effectiveness of 
four scenarios: (a) non-mitigation, where nothing is done to actively remove debris, (b) 
ADR 2020/5, where debris removal begins in the year 2020 with a rate of 5 of the most 
‘likely-to-collide’ objects removed per year; (c) ADR 2020/10, which is the same but with 
10 objects removed per year, and (d) ADR 2020/15 with fifteen objects removed per year. 
Liou and Johnson did not analyse the possible techniques of ADR, but it does not detract 
from their significant conclusion that removing as few as five of the most troublesome 
pieces of debris per year may massively ameliorate the Kessler syndrome.  
 According to figure 2, removing five troublesome debris objects every year will 
mean that the large debris population at the dawn of the 23rd century may be halved from 
approximately 60,000 to 30,000. This model assumes ADR begins in 2020, but if it begins at 
                                                          89 Ibid., pp. 239, 238. LEGEND is a NASA debris modelling system, which stands for LEO to GEO 
Environment Debris model. 
Fig. 3: Forecast of the cumulative collisions in LEO up to the early 23rd century. 
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a later date, the perceived value of ADR will only increase with time. The data is based on 
ADR which instantly removes the debris, but in reality de-orbiting debris may take some 
time (which varies with the technique). ADR via a foam method is an example of a 
‘delayed’ ADR: a satellite encases the target debris (between 1-10cm in diameter) in foam 
which increases the atmospheric drag over time, shortening the lifespan of the debris’ 
orbit.90 In other words, increasing the size of the debris increases the friction it creates 
against the residual particles of the atmosphere between 500km and 1000km altitude and 
hastens its return to Earth.91 Removing large debris objects is a long-term goal; and 
removing objects between 1-10cm is a shorter term goal.92 Removing large objects (greater 
than 10cm) will ameliorate the cause of smaller debris pieces. Space will become a much 
more hazardous environment for space operations, including military space support, 
treaty verification and global communications; a clear danger to military capabilities and 
provides some justification for including debris as a threat to national security. Whether or 
not debris is thought of as a security issue, active debris removal needs to be considered.  
IV - ADR methods 
 If we can reasonably assume from the data above that removing no less than five 
priority orbital debris objects per year (which are over 10cm in diameter), is a worthwhile 
goal, we can ask: which ADR methods or systems can be developed to achieve this task? 
Also, it is worthwhile to ask which systems may be used to remove objects between 1-
10cm in diameter as they are short-term goals which may appeal to space powers as they 
directly protect space assets from the most likely cause (in the numerical sense) of 
                                                          90 M. Andrenucci, P. Pergola, A. Ruggiero, ‘Active Removal of Space Debris Expanding foam application for active debris removal’, University of Pisa/European Space Agency, 21/02/2011. Available at: http://www.esa.int/gsp/ACT/doc/ARI/ARI%20Study%20Report/ACT-RPT-MAD-ARI-10-6411-Pisa-Active_Removal_of_Space_Debris-Foam.pdf (accessed 28/07/2012) p. 4 91 Liou and Johnson, ‘A sensitivity study...’ pp. 241-243 92 Brian Weeden, ‘Overview of Active Debris Removal’, Active Debris Removal Symposium, Leiden, Netherlands, June 21, 2012. http://swfound.org/media/84419/BW-ADR-Leiden-Jun2012.pdf (accessed 27/07/2012) 
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collision. Figure 493 shows a selection of ADR concepts and which kind of debris in which 
orbital altitudes they are designed to tackle. Also, the degree of potential damage risk 
from the size of debris is included.   
 
 ADR in LEO works through accelerating the natural decay process (such as the 
foam method above) with pieces below 10cm in diameter, and rendezvous operations 
with larger pieces. Rendezvous operations could be done either by dedicated satellites or a 
satellite which launches smaller propellant modules to attach to targeted debris. Laser 
ablation is a ‘promising’ technology which may allow the acceleration of the orbital decay 
of small pieces of debris.94 Ground, air, or space-based lasers could enact some thrust and 
momentum on debris through ablation. A repetitively pulsed laser beaming onto a 
                                                          93 Brian Weeden, 'Overview of the legal and policy challenges of orbital debris removal ', Space Policy (27, 2011) p. 39. Original table from: Olympio J, Summerer L, Naja G, Leitner J. Powerpoint presentation at the European workshop on active debris removal: “Towards a better understanding of active space debris removal options”, vol. 22; June 2010. Paris, France. 94 Ibid. 
Fig. 4: Table showing sizes and locations of debris and the kind of ADR systems needed to tackle them. 
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satellite over multiple windows of opportunity aims to slow the target by up to 200 metres 
per second (m/s).95 This would trigger a deorbiting of the debris. 
 A laser orbital debris removal (LODR) system is proposed to remove the 300,000 
objects that are between 1-20cm in diameter within two years of becoming operational. 
Objects of these size are claimed to be able to be ablated enough in one passing above a 
ground-based laser installation, with a price tag of $330 per object deorbited. The same 
proposal aims to remove 2,000 large debris objects within five years of operation, totalling 
a total mass of de-orbited objects at 3 kilotons (kt) with an estimated cost of over $1.5bn, or 
$500,000 per object removed.96 The elaboration of the laser system does not serve as a 
debate on the technical or economic feasibility of such systems, but rather as an 
illustration of what is being proposed as a means of ADR in order to discuss their 
potential political implications in the next chapter.  
 Other systems envisage more exotic methods such as Japanese plans97 for 
electrodynamic tethers (using Lorentz force theory98) which could convert electrical 
energy along a tether, attached to an ADR satellite, from the Earth’s magnetic field into 
kinetic energy and unleash it upon the target object. Another method is netting and 
tentacles (including ADR missions in GEO) – the European Space Agency has 
commissioned studies on the feasibility of ROGER (RObotic GEostationary orbit Restorer) 
since 2002.99 Another method is altering the spin of unstable debris via exhaust heat from 
                                                          95 Phipps and Lander, ‘What’s New for Laser Orbital Debris Removal?’... pp. 340-341  96 Ibid., p. 345 97 Satomi Kawamoto, Yasushi Ohkawa, Shoji Kitamura, Shin-Ichiro Nishida, ‘Strategy for Active Debris Removal Using Electrodynamic Tether’, Transactions of Space Technology Japan (7:26, 2009) 98 Carmen Pardini, Toshiya Hanada, Paula H. Krisko, ‘Benefits and risks of using electrodynamic tethers to de-orbit spacecraft’, Inter-Agency Debric Coordination Committee (IADC), IAC-06-B6.2.10. Available on-line: http://www.iadc-online.org/Documents/IADC-06-08.pdf  99 European Space Agency (ESA), ‘RObotic GEostationary orbit Restorer (ROGER)’, http://www.esa.int/TEC/Robotics/SEMTWLKKKSE_0.html, last update 02/11/2011. (Accessed 30/07/2012)  
Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security 
Page 45 of 69 
 
satellites; a patent has been filed in the US for this purpose.100 Stabilising debris would 
make it easier for other ADR systems to operate. With this brief sketch of certain ADR 
methods, it shows that scientific minds across the world are researching, and some 
agencies are promoting, ADR systems. The political implications need to be considered 
alongside pre-existing technical and economic discussions. All ADR systems are tasked 
with interacting with objects in space. Clear dual-use capabilities are evident in that an 
ADR system is not inherently restricted to targeting debris – working satellites could also 
be targeted. 
V - Conclusion 
 The crux of the matter is in the politics surrounding ADR systems and not in the 
finer technical workings or economic feasibilities of particular ADR systems. How these 
systems factor into space security considerations can now be considered in the light of the 
conceptual case for keeping ‘security’ traditional in space set out in chapter two, and the 
realisation that although ‘security’ has not been explicitly widened in US policy, there is a 
risk of ‘mission creep’ as evidenced by a tendency to refer to ‘global security’ and non-
military dangers in national security documents earlier in this chapter. Chapter 4 analyses 
the political implications of ADR and its dual-use nature, as well as how certain concepts 





                                                          100 US Patent Office (USPTO), ‘Stabilization of unstable space debris’, Patent No. 8,226,046, USPTO Full-text and Image Database, http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-bool.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&co1=AND&d=PTXT&s1=8226046&OS=8226046&RS=8226046, 24/07/2012. (Accessed 30/07/2012) 
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4: Duality 
I – Introduction 
 This chapter brings together the conceptual discussion in chapter two and the 
empirical study in chapter three to present a normative argument that space debris should 
not be considered a security issue. It tests the hypothesis spelled out in chapter two: using 
a widened concept of security in space endangers the potential of ADR systems to 
mitigate or even resolve the burden of orbital debris. In effect, this is an anticipation of the 
politics of ADR systems, and ideally serves as a preventative argument against any 
supporter of ADR systems attempting to justify action against debris on the grounds of 
‘national security’. This is done through a counterargument against widening the term 
‘space security’, which is so often used but seldom analysed. 
 This chapter begins by describing two political challenges that are posed by ADR 
systems. The first is in their development and deployment, the second is in their 
operation. These challenges are born of the inherent dual-use (also referred to as ‘duality’) 
potential of ADR systems. Thereafter, two differing interpretations of security are used to 
argue how the dual-use problem may be exacerbated by an all-encompassing ‘threat’ 
perception by the United States if and when ADR systems are actively developed and 
perhaps one day deployed. Finally, the chapter connects the two security concepts to the 
problem of duality and the potential of deploying potential ASAT systems without 
significant political fallout. 
II – I’m a janitor, not a soldier! 
 Focusing on the political dimensions of ADR is possible without too much of a 
focus on the technical and economic details of each particular kind of ADR system is 
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designed to interact with objects in orbit in one way or another by altering their orbital 
paths. Be it ESA’s ROGER, Switzerland’s ‘CleanSpace One’,101 JAXA’s (Japan Aerospace 
Exploration Agency) electrodynamic tether, or laser installations on the ground, all can be 
construed as systems capable of targeting and interfering with operational satellites as 
well as debris. 
 The first, and most problematic, political challenge posed by ADR systems is that 
they run the risk of being seen as ASAT weapons by external actors. This is an extremely 
important issue to bear in mind with any ADR system any space actor may wish to 
develop and deploy, because space weapons bear a large political significance beyond 
‘just another weapons system’.102 For example, if an American space-based ADR system is 
viewed as an ASAT weapon system in Beijing, the diplomatic and political fallout may be 
costly; it is not unreasonable to expect political costs following ASAT weapons 
deployment following Russian and Chinese initiatives via the Draft Treaty on the 
Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force 
Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT).103 The PPWT aims to ban all ‘weapons’ placement in 
space, going further than the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) which bans only the 
placement of “weapons of mass destruction” in space.104 Curiously, the PPWT does not 
                                                          101 Lifeslittlemysteries.org, ‘Switzerland to build ‘janitor’ satellite to clean up space’, 15/02/2012, http://www.lifeslittlemysteries.com/2165-janitor-satellite-cleanspace-space-junk.html accessed 31/07/2012.  102 Michael O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004) p. 21 103 Treaty document: Victor Vasiliev, ‘THE DRAFT TREATY ON THE PREVENTION OF THE PLACEMENT OF WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE, THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST OUTER SPACE OBJECTS’, Published in Security in Space: The Next Generation—Conference Report, 31 March–1 April 2008, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2008. http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2822.pdf (accessed 01/08/2012) 104 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html, accessed 01/08/2012.  
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ban Earth-to-space weapons, as it defines space weapons as weapons based in space.105 
Earth-based weapons targeted at space can be categorised as ‘space weapons’ if we define 
them as any system whose use destroys or damages working satellites in or from space. 
This definition paraphrases Moltz’s, but crucially changes the word ‘object’ to ‘satellite’.106 
By this definition, the PPWT would not ban all ‘space weapons’ – and would not affect 
already existing space weapons such as pre-existing American and Chinese kinetic-kill 
missiles and Earth-based lasers.107 The word ‘object’ in the PPWT also raises the possibility 
of banning ADR systems as their behaviour is almost identical to ASAT weapons if a 
distinction is not made between systems which target working satellites and debris. Ergo, 
space weapons should be defined in separate terms to that of ADR systems so that ADR 
systems are not consigned to the same restrictions as ASAT weapons from any potential 
PPWT-style treaty in the future. As a side-note, ground-based LODR systems may be less 
politically sensitive if Russian and Chinese definitions of ‘space weapons’ do not change, 
but may not be as effective in removing the largest and most troublesome debris objects. 
However, any LODR which was capable of removing large objects could easily alter the 
orbits or even disable large functional satellites in LEO. 
                                                          105 Alexei Arbatov, ‘Preventing an arms race in space’, in Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin (eds.) 
Outer Space: Weapons, Diplomacy, and Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010) p.85 106 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security... p. 43 107 The Economist, ‘Satellite Wars: Endangered birds’, in Technology Quarterly, Q4, 2010, 09/12/2010. http://www.economist.com/node/17647639 (accessed 01/08/2012)   
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 The second political challenge posed by ADR systems is in their operation. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the models for projecting the debris population after 
ADR operations begin is based on categorising certain debris objects that are most likely to 
cause more debris-generating events. These models do not take into account the politics of 
removing such objects. 
 Figure 5 shows who ‘owns’ the most debris (in both number and mass) in orbit.108 
There are legal difficulties surrounding ADR: there are no legal obligations among 
launching states to register debris objects; because of the lack of obligation of registry, on 
many occasions a launching state cannot be identified as many of the catalogued and 
uncatalogued debris are not in the UN debris registry - a situation of legal ambiguity 
exists over who should remove the debris; the launching states own the debris they create 
and there is no legal right from any other party to remove them; there are no conventions 
                                                          108 Kathy Jones, Krista Fuentes, David Wright, ‘A Minefield in Earth Orbit: How Space Debris Is Spinning Out of Control [Interactive]’, Scientific American, 01/02/2012, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-space-debris-spinning-out-of-control&WT.mc_id=SA_CAT_SPC_20120202# (accessed 01/08/2012) 
Fig. 5: The ownership of trackable space debris.  
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in place for the liability of ADR operations’ mishaps or accidents; and closely scanning 
space objects for the purposes of ADR may endanger intellectual property rights and give 
away trade secrets to the scanning actor. The political difficulties arise from: the imbalance 
of debris ownership (as seen in figure 5) coupled with the prioritisation of debris removal 
(object mass times collision probability) which would make any ADR attempt along such 
mathematical guidelines alone may seem highly politically motivated; as there is no 
obligation of declaration of debris, an ADR system could remove what may appear to be a 
defunct satellite but could turn out to be a dormant satellite for ulterior purposes and such 
a removal could be construed as an act of aggression; and finally, the duality of ADR 
systems could cause ‘instability’ and suspicion.109 
III – Widened space security vs. traditional space security 
 The two problems of development and operation are significant enough before we 
consider how a widened concept of security can exacerbate them. As established in 
chapter two, the hypothesis tested is that widening ‘space security’ is detrimental to 
tackling the issue of orbital debris in a politically amiable way between the space powers. 
The two concepts of security under scrutiny are: on the one hand we have a traditional 
security concept where the pursuit of space security (or security in space) should be taken 
to mean an actor’s attempts to protect its access to, and use of, space and the relevant 
satellite systems from intentional threats (physical and electronic) by other actors in space; 
and on the other we have a widened notion of space security which is taken to mean any 
threat (i.e. any risk of disruption, damage, or destruction) to all uses and users of space, 
epitomised by the Space Security Index and evidenced in the academic literature in chapter 
two.  
                                                          109 Weeden, 'Overview of the legal and policy...' pp. 40-42 
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 As Nair stated, perspectivism is important, if not essential, in thinking about 
security and what constitutes a threat.110 This is no less true of security in space and ADR 
systems. What do these two concepts do to the two problems above? If we first apply the 
widened space security approach to a US space policy perspective, orbital debris is 
considered a security issue for every actor as it threatens the use of systems in space, and 
should the Kessler syndrome grow even more acute, access to space would be threatened 
as well with fewer safe launch windows from Earth. The argument could be made that 
orbital debris will threaten the national security uses of space for all actors and will 
require ‘urgent’ action to remediate the situation. There is some merit in this argument – a 
large enough piece of debris will have similar consequences if it hits a crucial satellite as 
would the kinetic-kill vehicle in a hostile ASAT weapons system. Indeed, there is a 
congruence between a nationalist thinking of emergency (albeit measured over decades) 
with the need for action, and a globalist environmental position on orbital debris with 
alarming visions of the future environment.111 
 However, as argued in brief in Chapter 2: Section IV, using the national security 
lens to deal with the problem of orbital debris and in deploying ADR systems may be 
counterproductive, according to Daniel Deudney’s logic. Using a widened security 
concept may not work even if the deepened referent point of security was carried through 
in security policy. Indeed, as seen in chapter two, environmental hazards in space has 
pushed numerous scholars to refer to humanity as a whole or all space actors as the 
referent points of their widened space security concepts. It is true that environmental 
hazards in space are threats to all space-faring actors, and Deudney captures well how this 
logic widening of space security’s referent point came about: 
                                                          110 Nair, 'Space Security: Reassessing the Situation...’ p. 84 111 Deudney, 'The case against linking...’ pp. 466-467 
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 “… existing ‘us vs. them’ groupings in world politics match very poorly the causal lines of  environmental degradation. At its most basic level, the environmental problem asks us to  redefine who ‘us’ encompasses. Coping with global problems and new forms of  interdependence requires replacing or supplementing national with other forms of group  identity.”112  
In theory, widening may be logically sound. In practice, there are risks to attaching the 
word ‘security’ to what is a global problem. An American belief that it is acting on behalf 
of all space actors’ “space security interests”, or even the space environment, may be 
difficult to convey without foreign suspicion because ADR systems can be seen as ASAT 
weapons. 
 National security bureaucracies may contaminate ADR removal protocols by 
determining, according to their own calculi, which debris objects are more likely to 
interfere with their own satellites, rather than the objects which would pose a greater risk 
of increasing the debris population and poses a more immediate threat to another actor’s 
satellites or orbital paths. Conversely, a choice could be made not to remove debris which 
poses a more immediate threat to a potential adversary or the other party in a political 
dispute. In other words, securitising debris may elevate or even lower the priority of the 
solutions needed for the Kessler syndrome, but only on a self-interested national basis 
rather than a global commons approach, where ADR systems would ideally clean up orbit 
for all users, rather than useful orbits for US national security satellites and purposes. 
Organisations which protect from violence are different to those which are meant to 
manage environmental problems in that military organisations are hierarchical and 
secretive, remove debate away from vast swathes of civil society, and are trained in the 
arts of killing and destroying. Environmental issues, such as orbital debris, may require 
                                                          112 Ibid., p. 468 
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the opposite approach and “behaviour modification in situ.”113 Human behaviour needs to 
change by introducing routinising orbital clean-up operations; this is contrary to the 
possible effect of securitisation exceptionalising measures when they should be routine.114   
 What this means for orbital debris’ solution is that ADR systems, as part of a 
transparency and confidence building measure (TCBM) to alleviate fears over the duality 
of ADR, should be more open and not locked away in the bowels of the American 
military-industrial complex (MIC) with departments such as the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Securitising debris may push ADR systems down the 
path of defence procurement, which may exacerbate fears over the duality of such 
technological research to the other space powers. Furthermore, ADR should not be viewed 
in the context of a ‘supreme’ problem or the mass urgency required to defend against 
something akin to military aggression, where the political life or values of a state or any 
political actor capable of violence is threatened by the politically motivated violence of 
another actor. In security discourse, a problem may be presented as a supreme problem in 
need of urgent action.115 One can easily maintain a sceptical attitude towards the 
possibility of US security policy discourse deepening its referent point of security; there 
may only be merely a broadening of ‘security’ in space to include non-military risks, but 
viewed through the lens of the dangers such risks pose to, first and foremost, the United 
States and the naïve belief US security confers ‘security’ to everyone in the system. 
 Using the traditional concept of security in space helps to answer the question 
whether orbital debris is better addressed through ‘panic politics’ or ‘normal politics’?116 
As defined in chapter 2, ‘normal politics’ is a condition of peace or planning action that is 
not aggressively intended towards a particular actor. The point here is that orbital debris 
                                                          113 Ibid., pp. 464-465 
114 Dalby, Environmental Security... p. 10 115 Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework... p. 26 116 Ibid., p. 34 
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is not ‘dealt with’ by a traditional security concept in space. Orbital debris simply does not 
come into the space security threat analysis under a traditional concept of security as 
orbital debris and the dangers of the Kessler syndrome are not intentionally deployed 
offensive weapons systems by any actor, and they are indiscriminate in their targets.  
  ‘Space security’, according to a traditional understanding, would be more 
concerned with strategic studies and the conduct of military operations in, from, and 
through space. Michael O’Hanlon’s call for a hedging strategy with latent ASAT weapons 
research but a restraint on deployment is his answer to the United States’ perceived 
uneasiness with the potential security threat Chinese military capabilities and the 
proliferation of (counter) space technology poses.117 Joan Johnson-Freese wishes to see US 
space security improved via political and legal measures, as opposed to deploying 
systems to protect satellites from physical attack.118 The point here is not over the 
conclusions of their studies, but on their topic areas. Geographical and environmental 
factors are taken into account – but that does not lead to a widening of ‘space security’ or 
security in space for the United States. Indeed, any sound strategic planning has to take 
into account the terrain and the geographical context.119 An aversion to the risks generated 
by debris events, borne of an appreciation for the environmental risks of space warfare 
with hit-to-kill ASAT weapons, may force space warfare down the path of ground-based 
laser blinding and cyber operations to disable/deorbit/hijack satellites. Indeed, there has 
reportedly been a case where the United States lost control of a satellite to an unknown 
hacker which had accessed the relevant systems needed to issue commands to a NASA 
                                                          117 O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars... pp. 21, 90, 133-137 118 Johnson-Freese, Heavenly Ambitions... pp. 32, 63 119 David J. Lonsdale, The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future (London: Frank Cass, 2004) pp. 86-90, 94, 196, 203 
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satellite.120 If space warfare goes down an environmentally ‘cleaner’ path, debris may 
become a problem more associated with routine operations in space, rather than as a 
catastrophic consequence of a major physical conflagration in orbit. 
 By keeping ‘space security’ concerned with strategy, conflict, and the traditional 
connotations of ‘security’, orbital debris and ADR systems may be seen as (for lack of a 
better term) space development issues, rather than security ones. Space development here 
means the pursuit of cheaper, safer, and more reliable access to, and use of space, for all 
uses of space such as military, scientific, economic, observation, and so forth.121 Orbital 
debris is indeed not just a risk for the national security purposes of space, but for all uses 
of space.122 This brings back the notion of ‘normality’ to the debate over securitising 
orbital debris. Just the same as utilising SSNs for the safety of space assets to avoid 
collision is a routine operation, removing debris from orbit should also be a routine 
operation.  
 This normative assertion can be elaborated through a hypothetical scenario where 
space has been ‘sanctuarised’ from warfare.123 Orbital paths around Earth would still 
become polluted – the debris population has been increasing in the absence of overt 
military confrontation and before the 2007 ASAT test. Pollution would still be occurring in 
orbit regardless of the military significance an actor may be attaching to it. If polluting 
orbits is a normal and routine consequence of all human activity in outer space, cleaning 
up space should also be a routine operation to preserve the continued utility of space 
should the Kessler syndrome be realised. If ADR operations can be routinised and 
                                                          120 Nicole B. Johnson, ‘Report: Cyber attacks targeted US satellites’, Defense News, 28/10/2011, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20111028/DEFSECT01/110280301/Report-Cyber-Attacks-Targeted-U-S-Satellites (accessed 03/08/2012)   121 Nader Elhefnawy, ‘Economic growth and space development over the long haul’, The Space Review, 29/09/2008, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1220/1 (accessed 03/08/2012) 122 Brachet, ‘Collective Security in Space...’ pp. 8 123 John J. Klein, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles, and Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) p. 16-18 
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regulated among the space powers, the myriad of legal ambiguities and difficulties listed 
by Brian Weeden above can plausibly be overcome via a CoC or similar memoranda of 
understanding which did not insist on including clauses about ASAT weapons. 
 However, if debris is not considered a ‘security issue’, it may not get the funding 
attention it needs. Lobby groups in the United States may indeed want to attach ‘security’ 
to raise its political profile124 in order to get ADR systems the funding and action needed 
to develop them. This may be a problem posited by the American policymaking 
environment, as the presentation of environmental problems as ‘threats’ rests on a 
recurrent conflation of threat with risk (which is evidenced in chapter two). 
Environmental security, or the encroachment of ‘security’ upon environmental risks, may 
be a symptom of the highly politicised assessment of risk in US policymaking, rather than 
a relatively more objective or scientific account of non-political risks.125 To contextualise 
Jon Barnett’s claims, ‘threats’ posed by politically motivated actors in space are conflated 
with routine risks of operating in the space environment. Whilst no objective 
measurement of the Chinese threat to American space assets can be achieved, by contrast, 
the Kessler syndrome is more of an objective risk to space operations. Even though precise 
debris prediction models may vary within the scientific community, there does not seem 
to be much deviation from the generally accepted wisdom that debris removal needs to 
commence or space will become an increasingly degraded environment. 
IV – An impasse 
 Now that the possible effects of widened and traditional security concepts upon 
the debris issue has been elucidated, there appears to be an impasse between the 
arguments for and against the widening of ‘space security’. Widening space security, to 
                                                          124 Dalby, Environmental Security... p. 9 125 Jon Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security 
Era (London: Zed Books, 2001) p. 89 
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securitise orbital debris, appears to be able to confer a heightened prominence to the risks 
of debris and lobby policymakers to move ahead with ADR development in a sense of 
urgency as the Kessler syndrome does indeed make for grim forecasting on the space 
environment. Meanwhile, at the other end of this impasse, keeping space security 
traditional allows the MIC to stay in its defence and traditional security domains and 
concentrate on the threats of politically-motivated hostilities. This allows space debris to 
be categorised as something routine as a consequence of normal actions and accidents in 
space, and as a result ADR systems can be viewed as a necessary part of sustaining the 
viability of space for the uses of human civilisation. 
 At first glance this may not seem like much of an impasse, or at least an 
inconsequential one. A ‘widener’ of space security may ask ‘what does it matter how it is 
viewed? If it gets the funding, why not attach space debris onto the space security 
agenda?’ The intentions are agreeable; action is needed. However, when the problems of 
duality as substantiated above and the risks of security policy’s contamination of an 
environmental issue are realised we can appreciate the significance of this impasse, and a 
possible resolution. 
 Should ADR systems be developed in haste, or in ‘panic politics’ mode, Earth’s 
space-faring actors may indeed view a hasty development as a cover for ASAT weapons. 
Duality is hardly a novel problem. Weapons are ambiguous symbols,126 and many 
intended non-aggressive space systems can be considered a threat. Some ADR techniques 
have been present in ASAT weapons programmes concepts, such as on-orbit servicing and 
rendezvous. The military funding and general secrecy of development surrounding 
technologies associated with space situational awareness (SSA) and ADR serve to fuel 
                                                          126 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World 
Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) pp. 42-45 
Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security 
Page 58 of 69 
 
paranoia from abroad.127 This may be a phenomenon that may not be changed in the 
foreseeable future. For example, the National Reconnaissance Office’s (NRO) 
requirements for space sensors and the use of NASA-derived and USAF-operated X-37B 
Orbital Test Vehicle128 shows how NASA is linked with the MIC. Advanced sensor 
technologies from the NRO may indeed be required for enhanced ADR capabilities – this 
casts doubts on sharing ADR technology among states. Having the risks of orbital debris 
and ADR systems appear in security policy documents may only exacerbate the paranoia 
of the other space powers concerning US ASAT weapons development. Another 
significant risk of securitising debris and ADR systems, and the consequent risk that 
Russia and China may view such American systems with paranoia and label them as 
ASAT weapons, is that the PPWT may be pushed even further as an attempt to stall a 
perceived US attempt at weaponising space. As stated above, the PPWT refers to space 
weapons as systems based in space that interfere with space objects – rendezvous 
operations and other space-based ADR systems would be banned under the PPWT treaty. 
Securitising debris risks banning space-based systems from interacting with satellites for 
repair or debris for genuinely benign purposes. DARPA’s Phoenix Satellite Servicing 
programme is an example of space-based repair and building techniques which are 
essential for the further development of outer space, but is being developed within the 
MIC.129 
 If widening ‘space security’ carries these risks, does keeping security traditional 
reduce the risks of negative political consequences for an American ADR deployment? It 
is not asserted here that widening space security is certain to result in greater dual-use 
                                                          127 Brian Weeden, ‘Dealing with Galaxy 15: Zombiesats and on-orbit servicing’, The Space Review, 24/05/2010, http://thespacereview.com/article/1634/2 (accessed 03/08/2012) 128 Brian Weeden, ‘X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle Fact Sheet’, Secure World Foundation, 19/05/2010, http://swfound.org/media/1791/x-37b_factsheet.pdf (accessed 03/08/2012) 
129 DARPA, ‘Phoenix’, http://www.darpa.mil/our_work/tto/programs/phoenix.aspx (accessed 17/08/2012) 
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fears over ADR development, but it increases the risks of it happening, particularly if US 
security policy continues to regard itself as the referent point of security and may take 
unilateral action by removing debris which may belong to other space powers. 
Conversely, even if debris is not considered a security issue, the problems of operation 
still exist and may trigger diplomatic crises should customary or written laws not be 
created. 
 Taking the ‘security’ out of the orbital debris debate allows a sustainable 
development point of view to grow – the United States could frame its ADR in 
development terms and stress its ‘janitor’ credentials. A certain degree of openness may be 
required as a TCBM gesture – but the physics behind ADR may allow ADR systems to 
look non-threatening. Unlike a weapons system which may need a constant global 
presence in space for missions such as space blockade,130 an ADR system need not 
necessarily be the same. The previous chapter established the possibility that LEO could 
be made much safer by taking out as little as five troublesome debris objects per year. 
With legal agreements on removal forged between the three most polluting space powers, 
such a small number of ADR events could be regularised – indeed normalised – into the 
running of the global commons of space. ADR systems, unlike ASAT systems, need not be 
constantly deployed in orbit, as there would be a rationale and orbital path in mind to 
remove selected debris. Such a system could be notified to all users of space as a TCBM – 
and not even one satellite (be it ADR or ASAT) would pose much of a threat should it 
have hostile intentions. Indeed, China and the United States already possess the 
capabilities to remove or disable satellites in LEO. Stationing ADR systems in orbit may be 
too far a leap of faith between the space powers today – but regular and accessible launch 
dates and timetables for ADR could earn the acceptance of the other space powers should 
                                                          130 Klein, Space Warfare... pp. 29, 91-99 
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the USA deploy ADR systems.  Indeed, a routinisation of ADR operations is what 
Deudney refers to as ‘behaviour modification in situ’ – for humans to continue reaping the 
benefits of space, our behaviour needs to change from its present shape and begin to clean 
up orbit. 
V – Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown how securitising orbital debris may entail greater risks to 
addressing the problems posed by the Kessler syndrome. Widening space security may be 
risky because the intended referent point of security (all users of space and the 
environment) may not be carried through into security policymaking in Washington. A 
self-interested and unilateral approach to debris and ADR systems may exacerbate 
concerns over the duality of such systems and may result in greater efforts by other space 
powers to ban the technologies that both ASAT and ADR systems depend upon. In 
contrast, desecuritising debris and ADR systems may result in greater chances of 
reassuring the other space powers over genuine benign intentions with ADR systems by 
making such numerically small ADR operations routine (which are feasible) and a part of 
normal life for any space-faring actor.  
 The hypothesis has an answer: widening space security may increase the risks of 
negative international political consequences from developing and deploying ADR 
systems, and therefore endangering hopes of cleaning up orbit. Keeping ‘space security’ 
traditional improves the chance of a routinisation and normalisation of ADR activities and 
may prove more politically amiable should ADR be distanced from the American MIC 
and security policymaking. 
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5: Conclusion 
 This dissertation has argued that widening space security to incorporate referent 
points beyond the state (deepening) and non-military risks to space access and use 
(broadening) may exacerbate the risks inherent in deploying ADR systems because of 
their duality as ‘janitors’ and ‘soldiers’ in Earth’s orbits. Aligning efforts to develop and 
deploy ADR systems to ameliorate the Kessler syndrome with security discourse, policy, 
and organisations may trigger negative global political reaction for the United States as 
ADR may be seen as a cover for ASAT weapons deployments.  
 Chapter two challenged and critiqued the cascade of academia’s runaway 
widening of ‘space security’. Rather than adhere to a common definition of space security 
as all kinds of threats to all users of space, a traditional security-orientated definition of 
space security was put forward instead. From this, the ‘threats’ of traditional space 
security are the political-military threats that space powers may pose to one another. 
Environmental hazards were jettisoned from traditional space security thinking – but its 
importance has been substantiated through chapter three’s study of policy thinking about 
space debris and studies regarding the Kessler syndrome’s predictions of cascading 
collisions and runaway debris growth in orbit. Chapter four argued that there are risks to 
securitising debris and ADR systems which are not accounted for in academia, and 
perhaps the problem of orbital debris should be considered one of space development. 
Indeed, regardless of the politics surrounding outer space activities, debris will be 
generated. 
 Space debris is not inherently a political product of space – but one borne of 
humanity’s routine use of it. It is a ‘normal’ phenomenon given the technologies humans 
use to get into orbit. There is indeed a growing pressure to take action before the Kessler 
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syndrome becomes acute, but panic politics and securitisation may not be the best way to 
approach debris and ADR systems. Space development is a growing approach to outer 
space, particularly with the emergence of private companies (admittedly embryonic and 
often dependent on governments) planning to either provide access to space or harvest 
potential economic bounties from the solar system. Virgin Galactic is intent on entering 
the microsatellite market with a radically different and potentially cheap launch system, as 
well as providing sub-orbital tourist trips.131 Planetary Resources hopes to be able to profit 
from space cartography and mining missions.132 Despite access to space costing between 
$10,000 and $20,000 per kilogram sent into orbit which has not changed since the Apollo 
era,133 individuals are thinking of harnessing space’s resource-economic potential. Earth is 
not a closed system for human resources and habitation: James Vedda bemoans the lack of 
species-survival and economic thinking behind the US government’s approach to space 
exploration and development.134 Ken Murphy dreams of a cislunar econosphere for 
human civilisation.135  
 If such grand economic visions are to be realised, cleaning up space and keeping it 
clean will be a requirement just as much as environmental regulations for all sorts of 
activities on Earth. The Kessler syndrome must indeed be addressed for any such plans to 
have a chance of success, or insurance premiums may add another inhibiting factor to 
already extremely high launch costs! However, attempts at securitising debris should be 
                                                          131 Space Daily, ‘SST US collaborates with Virgin Galactic to offer radically cheaper options for small satellites’, 12/07/2012, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/SST_US_collaborates_with_Virgin_Galactic_to_offer_radically_cheaper_options_for_small_satellites_999.html (accessed 14/08/2010) 132 Planetary Resources, ‘Mission’, http://www.planetaryresources.com/mission/ (accessed 14/08/2010) 133 Martin Elvis, ‘After Apollo: Creating an economically robust space policy by learning from the American West’, The Space Review, 13/08/2012, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2137/1 (accessed 14/08/2012) 134 James A. Vedda, Choice, Not Fate: Shaping a Sustainable Future in the Space Age (Xlibris, 2009) pp. 3-5, 122, 155-165 135 Ken Murphy, ‘The cislunar econosphere (part 1)’, The Space Review, 20/02/2012, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2027/1 (accessed 14/08/2012) 
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resisted because it may exacerbate paranoia due to the duality of ADR systems, and the 
potential of anti-space weapons treaties such as the PPWT to ban the technologies and 
systems needed for them. 
 When considering an all-encompassing view of human activity in space, it is not 
one of ‘global space security’ as is so often seen in academia. It is space development or 
space safety – like regulating air and maritime traffic or venturing to a distant continent 
for mineral riches. It is hoped that this may trigger some self-reflection among academics 
(at least) and policymakers (at best) with regards to their use of the concepts of security 
with the crucial and often used but seldom analysed term, ‘space security’, lest we as a 

















Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security 
Page 64 of 69 
 
Bibliography 
Andrenucci, M.; P. Pergola, A. Ruggiero, ‘Active Removal of Space Debris Expanding foam application for active debris removal’, University of Pisa/European Space Agency, 21/02/2011. Available at: http://www.esa.int/gsp/ACT/doc/ARI/ARI%20Study%20Report/ACT-RPT-MAD-ARI-10-6411-Pisa-Active_Removal_of_Space_Debris-Foam.pdf (accessed 28/07/2012) Aoki, Setsuko, 'Japanese Perspectives on Space Security', in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) 
Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2008)  Arbatov, Alexei, ‘Preventing an arms race in space’, in Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin (eds.) Outer 
Space: Weapons, Diplomacy, and Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010) Baldwin, David A., ‘The Concept of Security’, Review of International Studies (23:1, 1997)    Banerjee, Dipankar, 'Indian Perspectives on Regional Space Security', in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2008)  Barnett, Jon, The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security 
Era (London: Zed Books, 2001) Beidleman, Scott W., ‘GPS vs Galileo: Balancing for position in space’, Astropolitics (3, 2005)  Brachet, Gerard, ‘Collective Security in Space: A key Factor for sustainable long-term use of space’, in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz, Emma S. Hinds (eds.) Collective Security in Space: European 
Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2007) 
 Booth, Ken; Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) Boutwell, Jeffrey, Theresa Hitchens, James Clay Moltz, 'Enhancing space security by improving stakeholder cooperation', Astropolitics (2, 2004)  Buzan, Barry; Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998)  Dalby, Simon, Environmental Security, (London: University of Minneapolis Press, 2002)  DARPA, ‘Phoenix’, http://www.darpa.mil/our_work/tto/programs/phoenix.aspx (accessed 17/08/2012)  Deudney, Daniel, 'The case against linking environmental degradation and national security', 
Millennium (19:3, 1990)  
The Economist, ‘Satellite Wars: Endangered birds’, in Technology Quarterly, Q4, 2010, 09/12/2010. http://www.economist.com/node/17647639 (accessed 01/08/2012) Elhefnawy, Nader, ‘Economic growth and space development over the long haul’, The Space Review, 29/09/2008, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1220/1 (accessed 03/08/2012) 
Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security 
Page 65 of 69 
 
 Elvis, Martin, ‘After Apollo: Creating an economically robust space policy by learning from the American West’, The Space Review, 13/08/2012, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2137/1 (accessed 14/08/2012) ESA, ‘RObotic GEostationary orbit Restorer (ROGER)’, http://www.esa.int/TEC/Robotics/SEMTWLKKKSE_0.html, last update 02/11/2011. (Accessed 30/07/2012) Gallagher, Nancy, ‘Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules for Space Security’, in John M. Logsdon, Audrey M. Schaffer (eds.) Perspectives on Space Security (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2005) 
 Grix, Jonathan, The Foundations of Research (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)  Grondin, David, ‘The (power) politics of space: The US astropolitical discourse of global dominance in the War on Terror’, in Natalie Bormann and Michael Sheehan (eds.) Securing Outer Space (London: Routledge, 2009) Hays, Peter L., Space and Security: A Reference Handbook (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2011)  Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), ‘IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines’, IADC 02-01, September 2007  http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/IADC_Mitigation_Guidelines_Rev_1_Sep07.pdf, (accessed 15/07/2012.)  Jaramillo, Cesar, (ed.) Space Security 2011 (Kitchener: Pandora Press, 2011) Available at www.spacesecurity.org, accessed 24/05/2012,  Jing, Zhong, 'China and Space Security', in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) Collective Security in 
Space: Asian Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2008)  Johnson, Nicole B., ‘Report: Cyber attacks targeted US satellites’, Defense News, 28/10/2011, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20111028/DEFSECT01/110280301/Report-Cyber-Attacks-Targeted-U-S-Satellites (accessed 03/08/2012) Johnson-Freese, Joan, Heavenly Ambitions: America’s Quest to Dominate Space (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009)  Jones, Kathy; Krista Fuentes, David Wright, ‘A Minefield in Earth Orbit: How Space Debris Is Spinning Out of Control [Interactive]’, Scientific American, 01/02/2012, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-space-debris-spinning-out-of-control&WT.mc_id=SA_CAT_SPC_20120202# (accessed 01/08/2012) Kawamoto, Satomi; Yasushi Ohkawa, Shoji Kitamura, Shin-Ichiro Nishida, ‘Strategy for Active Debris Removal Using Electrodynamic Tether’, Transactions of Space Technology Japan (7:26, 2009) Klein, John J., Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles, and Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) 
Lifeslittlemysteries.org, ‘Switzerland to build ‘janitor’ satellite to clean up space’, 15/02/2012, http://www.lifeslittlemysteries.com/2165-janitor-satellite-cleanspace-space-junk.html accessed 31/07/2012. Liou, J. C.; Nicholas L. Johnson,  'A sensitivity study of the effectiveness of active debris removal in LEO', 
Acta Astronautica (64, 2009) 
Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security 
Page 66 of 69 
 
Liou, J.-C., N.L. Johnson, N.M. Hill, 'Controlling the growth of future LEO debris populations with active debris removal', Acta Astronautica (66, 2010)  Listner, Michael, ‘Legal issues surrounding space debris remediation’, The Space Review, 06/08/2012, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2130/1 (accessed 17/08/2012)  Lochan, Rajeev, 'Some Reflections on Collective Security in Space', in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2008)  Logsdon, John M., ‘Change and continuity in US space policy’, Space Policy (27, 2011) Logsdon, John M.; James Clay Moltz, ‘Introduction’, in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) 
Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2008)  Logsdon, John M.; Gordon M. Adams, ‘Foreword’, in John M. Logsdon, Audrey M. Schaffer (eds.) 
Perspectives on Space Security (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2005)  Lonsdale, David J., The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future (London: Frank Cass, 2004) Malik, Tarik, ‘Tool bag lost in space meets fiery end’, Space.com, 03/08/2009, http://www.space.com/7088-tool-bag-lost-space-meets-fiery.html, accessed 15/07/2012.  Moltz, James Clay, ‘Next steps towards space security’, in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz, Emma S. Hinds (eds.) Collective Security in Space: European Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2007)  Moltz, James Clay, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008, 1st edition)  de Montluc, Bertrand, ‘Space Security: A non-US point of view’, in John M. Logsdon, Audrey M. Schaffer (eds.) Perspectives on Space Security (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2005) 
 Moorthi, D. Narayana, 'What 'Space Security' means to an emerging space power', Astropolitics (2, 2004)  Murphy, Ken, ‘The cislunar econosphere (part 1)’, The Space Review, 20/02/2012, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2027/1 (accessed 14/08/2012)  Nair, Kiran K., 'Space Security: Reassessing the Situation and Exploring Options', in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz (eds.) Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2008)  NASA, Orbital Debris Quarterly News (16:3, 2012) http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv16i3.pdf, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), ‘Space debris and human spacecraft’, http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html, accessed 15/07/2012.  O’Hanlon, Michael, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004) 
Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security 
Page 67 of 69 
 
Pardini, Carmen; Toshiya Hanada, Paula H. Krisko, ‘Benefits and risks of using electrodynamic tethers to de-orbit spacecraft’, Inter-Agency Debric Coordination Committee (IADC), IAC-06-B6.2.10. Available on-line: http://www.iadc-online.org/Documents/IADC-06-08.pdf Pasco, Xavier, ‘Enhancing Space Security in the Post Cold War Era: What Contribution from Europe?’, in John M. Logsdon, Audrey M. Schaffer (eds.) Perspectives on Space Security (Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, 2005) 
 Peoples, Columba, 'The growing securitization of space', Space Policy (26, 2010)  Phipps, Claude; Mike Lander, ‘What’s New for Laser Orbital Debris Removal?’, American Institute of 
Physics Conference Proceedings (No. 1402, 2011)  
Planetary Resources, ‘Mission’, http://www.planetaryresources.com/mission/ (accessed 14/08/2010) Root, Jeff, ‘Orbital speed’, Freemars.org, 18/09/2004, http://www.freemars.org/jeff/speed/index.htm (accessed 15/07/2012) Sadeh, Eligar; Brenda Vallance, ‘The Policy Process’, in Damon Coletta, Frances T. Pilch (eds.) Space and 
Defense Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010) Smith, Marcia S., ‘President Obama’s National Space Policy: A change in tone and a focus on space sustainability’, Space Policy (27:2011) 
Space Daily, ‘SST US collaborates with Virgin Galactic to offer radically cheaper options for small satellites’, 12/07/2012, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/SST_US_collaborates_with_Virgin_Galactic_to_offer_radically_cheaper_options_for_small_satellites_999.html (accessed 14/08/2010)  Stern, Maria; Joakim Ojendal 'Mapping the Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?', Security Dialogue (41:1, 2010)  UNOOSA, ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html, accessed 01/08/2012 US DoD, ‘National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary’, January 2011, Washington, D.C., available online: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/ (accessed 24/05/2012) US Government, ‘National Security Strategy’, May 2010, Washington, D.C. Available online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 02/07/2012) US Government, ‘National Space Policy of the United States of America’, 28/06/2010, Washginton, D.C., available online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf  (accessed 02/07/2012) US Patent Office (USPTO), ‘Stabilization of unstable space debris’, Patent No. 8,226,046, USPTO Full-text and Image Database, http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-bool.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&co1=AND&d=PTXT&s1=8226046&OS=8226046&RS=8226046, 24/07/2012. (Accessed 30/07/2012) 
Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security 
Page 68 of 69 
 





Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security 
Page 69 of 69 
 
 
